Modeling High-Temperature Superconductivity: Correspondence at Bay? by Hartmann, Stephan
Modeling High-Temperature Superconductivity:
Correspondence at Bay?∗
Stephan Hartmann
August 13, 2007
Abstract
How does a predecessor theory relate to its successor? According to Heinz Post’s
General Correspondence Principle, the successor theory has to account for the em-
pirical success of its predecessor. After a critical discussion of this principle, I outline
and discuss various kinds of correspondence relations that hold between successive
scientific theories. I then look in some detail at a case study from contemporary
physics: the various proposals for a theory of high-temperature superconductivity.
The aim of this case study is to understand better the prospects and the place
of a methodological principle such as the Generalized Correspondence Principle.
Generalizing from the case study, I will then argue that some such principle has
to be considered, at best, as one tool that might guide scientists in their theoriz-
ing. Finally I present a tentative account of why principles such as the Generalized
Correspondence Principle work so often and why there is so much continuity in
scientific theorizing.
1 Introduction
Philosophers of science provide us with idealized accounts of science. Sadly, however,
these accounts often do not work, as the endless series of discussions among philosophers
shows. These discussions typically follow a common scheme: In step 1, a philosopher
suggests a theory of X (say, explanation, theory change or what have you). In step
2, other philosophers criticise this account. Some point out internal problems of the
account in question, others present a counterexample. Such a counterexample shows that
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the account in question does not always apply and this is taken to effectively refute it
alltogether. In step 3, a new universal account is suggested and it is shown, perhaps,
that it deals well with the counterexamples of the previous account. But it is soon shown
to have other problems. And so on. Philosophers typically come up with universal and
all-encompassing accounts, often based on or motivated by some simple and plausible
principle which, at the end of the day, almost inevitably fails when confronted with the
practice of science.
Scientists, on the other hand, proceed in a diffferent way, which – if successful – com-
bines a bottom-up (i.e. data-driven) methodology with a top-down (i.e. theory-driven)
methodology. They construct models which account for a comparably small set of phe-
nomena and do not intend for them to be universal in scope. Models are local, not global
or universal, and once a models fails, its domain of applicability is (typically, though not
necessarily) restricted and a new model with a (typically, though not necessarily) wider
scope is put forward. Most importantly, scientists are aware of the fact that models in-
volve idealizations and that they do not provide final answers to all questions they have
about the object or system under investigation. And yet, models serve various purposes
in the process of science (explanation, prediction, policy recommendations etc.), and they
do so very well, which is arguably one of the reasons why science as a whole is so success-
ful. While some models in science are formulated in the framework of a theory (“models
of a theory”), such as classical mechanics, others are constructed in the absence of a
model-constraining theory (“phenomenological models”). A stock example of a model of
a theory is the model of a pendulum, and Bohr’s model of the atom is an example of a
phenomenological model (see Frigg and Hartmann (2006)).
I hold that philosophers of science can learn much from scientists. They should be more
modest and aim at constructing models, not theories that aim at getting everything right
in just one shot. As in science, more general principles might be applied here or there,
but their applicability has to be approached critically. Rather than arguing for this point
in abstracto, I will present an example from the philosophy of science that indicates how
my proposal works.1
The philosophical discussion of scientific theory change illustrates my approach very well.
Leaving somewhat more fine-grained positions aside, two main accounts of scientific the-
ory change can be identified. On the one hand, there is the traditional cumulative account
according to which science progresses by adding more and more details to already exist-
ing accounts. This view, which stresses the continuity of scientific theorizing, met serious
criticisms when confronted with episodes from the history of science. Inspired by this
criticism, Kuhn, Feyerabend and others suggested an account of scientific theory change
1For more on my views on modeling in philosophy of science, see Hartmann (2007).
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that stresses discontinuities in scientific theorizing.2 Buzz words like ’scientific revolution’
and ’incommensurability’ figure prominently in this account, which gives, just like the
cumulative view, a universal answer to the question of how scientific theory change works.
One universal philosophical account is replaced by another universal account, but both
get in trouble when confronted with cases from real science, as scientific theory change
involves both continuity (or stability) and discontinuity (or instability).
There is certainly much more continuity in scientific theorizing, even across revolutions,
than Kuhn and his followers made us think. And there might be even more continuity in
the future. In The Social Construction of What?, Hacking elaborates this point:
[F]uture large-scale instability seems quite unlikely. We will witness radical
developments at present unforseen. But what we have may persist, modified
and built upon. The old idea that sciences are cummulative may reign once
more. Between 1962 (when Kuhn published Structure) and the late 1980s,
the problem for philosophers of science was to understand revolution. Now
the problem is to understand stability. (Hacking 1999: 85)
So how can the prevalent stability in science be understood philosophically? As the
simple cumulative model does not work, an account is needed that stresses, besides the
importance of continuities (or stability), the inevitable presence of more or less disruptive
discontinuities (or instability) in scientific theorizing. Such an account is hard to come
by and I will not present a fully worked out version of it in this contribution. Instead,
I will point out a reasonable way for how one should proceed to arrive eventually at
such an account. Following the scientist’s strategy, I propose to combine a top-down
with a bottom-up strategy and will proceed in two steps: First, I will examine examples
from real science to obtain an account of the various ways in which scientific theories
relate to their predecessors. This step follows a bottom-up strategy. Second, I will try to
understand philosophically the prevalent continuitiy (or stability) in scientific theorizing,
as pointed out by Hacking and as suggested by my case studies. This step proceeds in
top-down fashion, as I will relate the findings of the case study to a more general, though
sufficiently flexible, philosophical theory.
To set the scene, I will start with a critical discussion of Heinz Post’s Generalized Cor-
respondence Principle (section 2). I will then outline and discuss various kinds of corre-
spondence relations that hold between successive scientific theories (section 3). Section
2This is not to say that there is no place for continuities in Kuhn’s philosophy of science. In The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn (1996) devotes a whole chapter to a discussion of “normal
science”, which is characterized by an accumulation of solved puzzles. Scientific theory change, however,
is discontinuous.
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4 then looks in some detail at a case study from contemporary physics: the various pro-
posals for a theory of high-temperature superconductivity. The aim of this case study
is to understand better the prospects and the place of a methodological principle such
as the Generalized Correspondence Principle. Generalizing from the case study, I will
then argue that some such principle has to be considered, at best, as one tool that might
guide scientists in their theorizing (section 5). Finally, in section 6, I present a tentative
account of why principles such as the Generalized Correspondence Principle work so often
and why there is so much continuity in scientific theorizing.
2 Post’s General Correspondence Principle
Post’s General Correspondence Principle is a generalization of the quantum mechanical
correspondence principle.3 This principle played a crucial role for Niels Bohr and others
in the process of constructing the new quantum mechanics in the 1920s. It was expected
that quantum mechanics would account, within certain limits, for the well-confirmed
phenomena of classical physics. The quantum mechanical correspondence principle is
however somewhat more complicated, as Radder (1991) has shown. The latter consists
of various interrelated parts which I will not discuss here. In a first attempt, Post gives
the following characterization of ’his’ General Correspondence Principle:
Roughly speaking, this is the requirement that any acceptable new theory L
should account for its predecessor S by ’degenerating’ into that theory under
those conditions under which S has been well confirmed by tests. (Post 1971:
228)
The General Correspondence Principle is claimed to be valid even across scientific revolu-
tions. It presupposes that the predecessor theory S and the successor theory L “refer (in
their statements) to at least some events or facts which are identifiably the same” (Post
1971: 220), or, to phrase it differently, that S and L share a common set of phenomena.
The domain of L is assumed to be larger than the domain of S and the account given
by L will usually be more precise (or at least not less precise) than the account of the
phenomena given by S. A typical example is the relation between classical mechanics
and the special theory of relativity. The latter theory also correctly describes particles
with a velocity close to the speed of light and provides a more accurate account at low
velocities than the former.
Post goes on to discuss several possible relations between S and L that range from a
complete reduction (which seems hardly ever to occur in science) to approximate or
3This section and the next draw on material published in Hartmann (2002).
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inconsistent correspondence, but without explanatory losses (such as the just mentioned
relation between classical mechanics and the special theory of relativity). Other possible
relations between S and L which exhibit losses would count as evidence against the
General Correspondence Principle; Post holds that these relations never occured in the
history of science of the last three hundred years – apart from one noteworthy exception
that will be discussed below.
One of Post’s favorite examples to support the General Correspondence Principle is the
periodic system, which survived the quantum mechanical revolution.4 Post explains:
The periodic system is the basis of inorganic chemistry. This pattern was not
changed when the whole of chemistry was reduced to physics, nor do scientists
ever expect to see an explanation in the realm of chemistry which destroys
this pattern. The chemical atom is no longer strictly an atom, yet whatever
revolutions may occur in fundamental physics, the ordering of chemical atoms
will remain. (Post 1971: 237)
Post generalizes this example and maintains that the low-level structure of theories is
particularly stable, while higher and less-confirmed levels are subject to change in the
process of scientific theorizing. The pattern of the atoms remains, although quantum
mechanics replaced the former framework theory. This principle seems, at first sight,
to be quite plausible; but is it correct? Doubts arise once one recalls that Post himself
confesses that the successful part of S may be smaller from the perspective of the new
theory L than from the perspective of S (Post 1971: 232). Given this, it is not clear how
there can be a ’resistant kernel’ in the long run which “remains pragmatically true . . . for
all time”, as da Costa and French (1993: 146) suggest.
Later Post refines his proposal to also account for theories S and L with a different vo-
cabulary. These vocabularies have to be translated into each other and this translation
T may turn out to be more difficult than a mere one-to-one mapping. Also, a condition
Q on L has to be specified such that the truncated L and S have (perhaps only approx-
imately) the same domain. If the well-confirmed part of S is denoted by S∗ (the extent
of which is only a conjecture at a given time5) the General Correspondence Principle can
be conveniently expressed as S∗ = T (L|Q) – the well-confirmed part of S is identical to
the suitably translated part of L which fulfils the condition Q. If L∗ is the well-confirmed
part of L and S∗∗ is the intersection of S∗ and L∗ then the thesis of zero Kuhn losses is
that S∗ is identical to S∗∗. Post claims that the historical record supports this thesis.6
4For an excellent account of this case study, see Scerri (2006).
5Cf. Koertge (1973: 172 f).
6For a comparison of Post’s General Correspondence Principle with other correspondence principles,
such as the ones suggested by Fadner, Krajewski, Radder, and Zahar see Radder (1991).
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It should be noted, however, that Post’s analysis does not take the ’loser’s perspective’
into account. From this perspective there are indeed successes of the old theory which
the new theory cannot account for.7 Besides, even from the ’winner’s perspective’ the
thesis of zero Kuhn losses may be too strong. Saunders (1993: 296), for example, writes
that ”Laudan [(1981)] is right to insist that one can always find some theorem, deduction,
conjecture, or explanation that has no precise correlate in the successor theory”. He then
goes on, though, to distinguish between significant and insignificant Kuhn losses; only the
insignificant ones are, of course, ’allowed’. I will come back to this issue below. Radder
(1991) has pointed out another problem for Post’s approach: Not all equations of L may
’degenerate’ in equations of S. As an example, consider the famous formula E = m0c
2
for the energy of a particle with rest mass m0. This equation makes sense only in the
special theory of relativity. It remains unaltered in the limit of low velocities v (i.e. for
β := v/c→ 0), although it does not correspond to an equation of classical mechanics.
According to Post, the General Correspondence Principle is both a descriptive and a
normative thesis. It is considered to be a post hoc elimination criterion and theories
which do not fulfill it should be, as Post boldly advises, consigned to the ’wastepaper
basket’ (Post 1971: 235). Examining cases from the history of science, Post only spotted
one ’counterexample’ to the General Correspondence Principle. Ironically it is the best
theory we have today: quantum mechanics, a theory that, or so Post argues, does not
account for the successes of its predecessor classical mechanics (Post 1971: 233). This
is a crucial failure which Post blames on the supposed incompleteness of quantum me-
chanics (Post 1971: 234, 246).8 Quantum mechanics therefore does not, for Post, count
as a case against the General Correspondence Principle. Instead the fact that quantum
mechanics does not fulfil the General Correspondence Principle shows that this theory
should not be accepted or at least that it should not be considered to be the successor of
classical mechanics. It belongs, perhaps, in the wastepaper basket. Other proponents of a
generalized correspondence principle, such as Radder, do not go as far and emphasize cor-
respondence relations that do hold between quantum mechanics and classical mechanics.
Their arguments will be examined in the next section.
Before doing so, another issue needs to be mentioned. So far, the following three theses
are in conflict: (1) Post’s General Correspondence Principle is descriptively correct, (2)
the belief in the truth of quantum mechanics is justified and (3) quantum mechanics
and classical mechanics share a common set of phenomena. Rather than rejecting theses
(1) or (2) one might doubt thesis (3). Cartwright (1999), for example, argues that we
7Cf. Hoyningen-Huene (1993: 260-262) and the references to the work of Kuhn cited therein.
8It is interesting to speculate how Post would evaluate the recent work on decoherence and the alleged
“emergence of a classical world in quantum theory”. See Joos et al. (2003).
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have good reasons to believe that there are two disjunct classes of phenomena; some can
be modeled by using the toolbox of quantum mechanics, others by relying on classical
mechanics. There is consequently no quantum mechanical model of classical phenomena.
Contrary to Cartwright, however, Post and – I believe – most physicists hold the view
that quantum mechanics and classical mechanics do share a common set of phenomena.
They assume that quantum mechanics accounts for the phenomena of classical mechanics
in principle; it is merely a matter of computational complexity to demonstrate this. In
the end, however, this might be nothing but a metaphysical dream.
What is the outcome of the discussion so far? First of all, when the General Correspon-
dence Principle is applied, it often does not hold strictly, as Radder’s example shows.
Besides, there are losses from the loser’s perspective and maybe also losses from the win-
ner’s perspective. Secondly, as a consequence of all this, there is a tension between the
practice of actual science and a normative reading of the General Correspondence Princi-
ple. And yet Post is right when he points out that there is a lot of continuity in scientific
theorizing, even across scientific revolutions. Still, the relations between various theories
in the history of science are much more complicated than the General Correspondence
Principle makes us believe. Perhaps there is no single and non-trivial principle which
captures the rich structure and variety of developing scientific theories. This can only be
established empirically. What is needed, therefore, is a careful examination of episodes
from contemporary science and the history of science on which, perhaps, a meta-induction
can be based. As a first step, it is helpful to highlight various relations which hold between
successive scientific theories. This is what we will do in the next section.
3 A Plurality of Correspondence Relations
In the development of scientific theories, continuities as well as discontinuities appear.
Hence, the interesting question to be addressed is this: Which elements of S and L
correspond to each other, and which elements do not? Are there general rules that guide
practising scientists in those difficult decision situations (if it can be reconstructed as
such)? As a prolegomenon to such a task, it is reasonable to examine more closely how
specific scientific theories relate to each other. Which elements are taken over, what are
the motives for doing so and how are the elements of the old theory made to fit the new
theory? Examining cases from various sciences, I will address these questions and provide
a preliminary (and not necessarily exhaustive) list of correspondence relations which may
hold between successive theories. Some theories exhibit more than one of these relations,
and some correspondences appear at different stages of the development of a theory.
A first useful distinction is between ontological and epistemological correspondence rela-
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tions. An ontological correspondence relation holds between S and L if some or all of
the entities of S are also entities of L. In this contribution, I will consider only episte-
mological correspondence relations, i.e. relations between the theories in question. The
following types of epistemological correspondence relations can be distinguished:
1. Term Correspondence. Here certain terms from S are taken over into L. This is
a standard strategy in the development of scientific theories. In The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions Kuhn writes that “[s]ince new paradigms are born from old
ones, they ordinarily incorporate much of the vocabulary and apparatus, both con-
ceptual and manipulative, that the traditional paradigm had previously employed”
(Kuhn 1996: 149). Now it is well-known that Kuhn also argues in the very same
book that this continuity goes along with meaning variance and problems of refer-
ence. A standard example is the meaning shift from ’mass’ in classical mechanics
to ’mass’ in the special theory of relativity. A disclaimer or two is in order here.
Term correspondence does not imply that all terms of a theory correspond to terms
in the successor theory. Often, only a few key terms are carried over, while others
are left aside and new terms are coined in addition. Also, a correspondence relation
between two theories can be established by a suitable translation of the respective
terms. Term Correspondence is a rather minimal requirement; it is presupposed by
all other corrrespondence relations to be discussed below.
2. Numerical Correspondence. Here S and L agree on the numerical values of some
quantities (cf. Radder 1991: 203-204). Numerical Correspondence therefore pre-
supposes Term Correspondence. An example is the spectrum of hydrogen in the
Bohr model and in quantum mechanics. Although the assumptions that were made
to calculate the spectrum differ considerably in both theories, they nevertheless lead
to the same numerical values. Again, this is a rather weak kind of a correspondence
relation which is moreover usually realized only approximately (as in the example
just discussed). Its heuristic value is low since the principle can only be applied post
hoc. Obviously, Numerical Correspondence is only interesting in the mathematical
sciences; it does not apply, for instance, in large parts of biology or archeology.
3. Observational Correspondence. This kind of correspondence relation is introduced
in Fine (1993) in the context of his interesting resolution of the quantum mechanical
measurement problem. Fine does not accept Cushing’s claim that Bohm’s version
of quantum mechanics should have been chosen according to Post’s General Cor-
respondence Principle (Cushing 1993: 262), because the Bohm theory “did not
enable one to retrieve the classical and well-confirmed account of a ball rebound-
ing elastically between two walls” (Fine 1993: 280). It therefore does not fulfil
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Post’s correspondence principle. Bohm’s theory does, however, fulfil a weaker form
of a correspondence principle. Fine writes: “[W]here the classical account itself is
well-confirmed, the Bohm theory ’degenerates’ into the classical account of what we
are expected to observe under well-defined conditions of observation” (Fine 1993:
280). Unfortunately, the standard Copenhagen version of quantum mechanics does
not fulfil the principle of Observational Correspondence and Fine therefore presents
his solution of the measurement problem in order to restore this. Abstracting from
quantum mechanics, Observational Correspondence means that L ’degenerates’ into
what we are expected to observe according to S∗ under well-defined conditions of
observation. Observational Correspondence, like Numerical Correspondence, pre-
supposes Term Correspondence, but differs from Numerical Correspondence, which
may also apply when the quantities in question cannot be observed. Besides, Obser-
vational Correspondence relations can also hold in sciences which do not represent
their content numerically. Observational Correspondence emphasizes the role of the
conditions of observation which are especially important in the context of quantum
mechanics. A heuristic principle based on the demand of Observational Corre-
spondence is again only a post hoc selection criterion. It is of no help in the actual
process of constructing new theories. Observational Correspondence alone also does
not suffice to provide an explanation for the success of the old theory. It is therefore
weaker than Post’s General Correspondence Principle.
4. Initial or Boundary Condition Correspondence. According to a well-known view
of scientific theories, a theory is a set of axioms (or laws) plus suitable initial or
boundary conditions. Kamminga (1993) complains that the philosophical focus is
too much on the axioms (or laws), leaving initial and boundary conditions aside.
This is unfortunate, since especially in the non-formal sciences, Kamminga claims,
these conditions play an important role which is relevant to the issue of inter-theory
relations. It turns out that there are theories which incorporate consequences of
their predecessor as an initial or boundary condition. An example from the research
on the origin of life illustrates Kamminga’s general point which she sums up as
follows: “[I]n the attempt to integrate the original theory T with another theory
outside its domain, some consequence of the latter is incorporated into T as an
antecedent condition, which then places strong constraints on the selection of laws
that have explanatory relevance in the modified theory T ′” (Kamminga 1993: 77).
This procedure, therefore, provides a link between the two theories. Note, however,
that this way of connecting two theories is only a very loose one. It has some
heuristic value but it should be noted that the assumptions taken over from the
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predecessor theory remain unexplained in the successor theory.
5. Law Correspondence. Laws from S also appear in L. This kind of correspondence
relation often holds only approximately. An example are the laws for the kinetic
energy in classical mechanics and in the special theory of relativity. For low veloc-
ities, TCM = 1/2 mv
2 and TSRT = (m −m0) c2 = 1/2 mv2 · (1 + 3/4 β2 +O (β4))
are approximately the same. Hence, the special theory of relativity reproduces
and explains the successful part of classical mechanics. It is probably this kind of
a correspondence relation which Post had in mind when he suggested his General
Correspondence Principle. Law Correspondence implies Numerical Correspondence
and presupposes Term Correspondence, the difficulties of which (such as meaning
variance etc.) therefore occur again. Despite all this it is required that the terms
in question have the same operational meaning in S and L (cf. Fadner 1985: 832).
In many cases, Law Correspondence is only a post hoc selection criterion of theory
choice. As Radder’s above-mentioned example demonstrates, it may only hold for
some of the laws of the theories in question.
6. Model Correspondence. This type of a correspondence relation comes in two vari-
ants. (1) A model which belongs to S survives theory change and re-occurs in L.
A typical example is the harmonic oscillator which is widely used in classical me-
chanics, but is also applied in quantum mechanics and in quantum field theory. It
should be noted that models, such as the harmonic oscillator, are not only taken
over by the theory which succeeds the original theory, but also by quite unrelated
theories. This is best seen by pointing to all other theories of physics which employ
the harmonic oscillator; in fact, it is difficult to find a theory which does not employ
this model. Model Correspondence of this first kind has a considerable heuristic
potential. It is, however, not guaranteed that the new theory explains the success
of the old theory, because the model in question may be embedded in a completely
new framework theory which may also affect the overall correspondence relation
between S and L. (2) Post mentions another strategy of theory construction which
takes models seriously: “In this case we adopt a model already available which may
initially have been offered as an arbitrary articulation of the formalism only. [. . . ]
It is a case of borrowing a model of the S-theory which contained features not es-
sential for the modelling of the S-theory (’neutral analogy’), and assigning physical
significance to such extra features” (Post 1971: 241). An example is the crystallo-
graphic models which were used already a century before physicists identified the
units of the regular lattices with physical atoms. Sometimes, Post concludes, sci-
entists built “better than they knew” (Post 1971: 242). This example also shows
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that Model Correspondence of this second kind may indeed lead to an explanation
of the success of the predecessor theory.9 However, the criterion is highly fallible,
as Post himself grants.
7. Structure Correspondence. Here the structures of S and L correspond. But what
is a structure, and what does it mean that two structures correspond? One op-
tion is to use the term ’structure’ only in its precise mathematical meaning. If
one does so, it is not difficult to flesh out the idea of a correspondence relation
between two structures by applying mathematical concepts such as sub-groups and
group contractions. And indeed, many theories in physics can be linked to each
other in this way. A typical example is the relation between the inhomogeneous
Lorentz group (that characterizes the special theory of relativity) and the inhomo-
geneous Galilei group (that characterizes classical mechanics) which ’correspond’
in a precise mathematical sense. In examples like this Structure Correspondence
works best. Another interesting case is the relation between the theories of Ptolemy
and Copernicus. Saunders shows that “[a]n astronomy based only on epicycles [. . . ]
corresponds to an expansion of the form
∑
i ci exp (iωit) (with the earth chosen as
origin)” (Saunders 1993: 299). So the mathematical structures of both theories
are (perhaps only approximately) the same, which leads Saunders to the conclu-
sion that there is no reason to worry about the abandonment of the Aristotelian
world-view or a wholesale change of paradigm (Saunders 1993: 298).
Saunders’ large-scale fight against relativism10 appears somewhat cheap; parts of
theories where problems for the idea of correspondence show up are stamped as
’insignificant’ (such as the ontology of a theory11, but also laws) while only the
mathematical structure of a theory remains, in some sense, stable. But even here
things are not that easy. With respect to the role of gravity, Saunders concedes
that he does “not suggest that these things can be completely codified” but goes
on to confess that this strategy “is, and [. . . ] has always been, the essence of the
enterprise of dynamics” (Saunders 1993: 306). Confessions like this are not enough
to provide a vigorous defence of the cumulative, progressive view of the history of
physics, but Saunders showed that mathematical structures of consecutive theories
may and often do correspond in a strict mathematical sense.
Structure Correspondence does not imply Numerical Correspondence. Often, the
9For more on the relation between models and theories see Frigg and Hartmann (2006).
10Note that for Saunders, ’relativism’ is a collective name for social constructivism, historicist episte-
mology, linguistic holism and anti-realism; cf. Saunders (1993: 295 f).
11Cf. Saunders’ discussion of ether in Saunders (1993: 299).
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structure is ’too far away’ from the empirical basis of a theory in order to guar-
antee continuity at that level (especially in the cases Saunders has in mind). It
is therefore not at all trivial to reproduce the empirical success of the precursor
theory once one has decided to take over parts of the structure of the old theory.
Despite this, Structure Correspondence has a very high heuristic value, especially in
contemporary theoretical physics. Because of the huge gap between the respective
theories (such as superstring theory) and the world to which we have empirical ac-
cess, structure-based reasoning, such as symmetry considerations, is often the only
tool which enables scientists to proceed. However, when it comes to other sciences,
such as biology or archeology, Structure Correspondence does not seem to be of
much value, especially if one explicates ’structure’ mathematically.
Three conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis: First, successive theories can
be related in many ways. Sometimes only Numerical Correspondence holds (at least
approximately), in other cases entire mathematical structures correspond. Every case is
different. This is why global philosophical issues, such as meaning variance and incom-
mensurability, should be discussed ’locally’, i.e. on the basis of concrete case studies that
exemplify specific types of relations between scientific theories. The details might, and
often do, matter.
Second, there are continuities and discontinuities in scientific theorizing, although it is
not a priori clear which elements of a theory will survive theory change, and which ones
will have to go. An additional difficulty for correspondence theorists is the notorious
problem of underdetermination. Maybe there is no unique best choice regarding which
elements of successive theories should correspond and which should not correspond with
each other.
Third, the philosophical project of a methodology is best described by the picture of
a toolbox. According to this view, methodologists extract – ideally on the basis of a
wealth of case studies – a set of methods and techniques which can tentatively be applied
by practicing scientists in a particular situation. What is in the toolbox may, however,
depend on time. Good scientists know, of course, already a wealth of tricks and methods,
and they also know how to use them flexibly and appropriately. This view of the status
of methodology is a middle ground between two extreme positions. Zahar (1983: 258 f)
defends a rather strong form of a rational heuristics which leaves little room to chance
and other influences, while Popper’s (1972: ch. 7) evolutionary picture supports the
opposite view, that there is no rational heuristics and it is the job of the scientists to
make bold conjectures which then have to ’survive’ empirical tests and rational criticism
(cf. Radder 1991: 201 f). My conclusion seems, after all, to be similar to Post’s view
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on the role of heuristics which he illustrates with an apt analogy: “The study of the
structure of existing houses may help us in constructing new houses” (Post 1971: 217).
4 Modelling High-Temperature Superconductivity:
A Case Study
In this section, I will look at a case study from contemporary physics and ask which role
heuristic principles such as the General Correspondence Principle play in science. The
case study deals with a scientific episode that is ongoing. So far, there is no consen-
sus in the scientific community, only a multitude of more or less elaborated competing
research programs and strategies. I’ll identify some of these strategies and ask which
role correspondence considerations play when scientists are confronted with an intricate
problem.
The case study deals with our theoretical understanding of high-temperature supercon-
ductivity. Conventional superconductivity is a phenomenon long well known and un-
derstood. It occurs at extremely low temperatures close to the absolute zero. For a
long time, it was considered to be impossible to find or produce substances that remain
superconducting if the temperature is raised to, say, 30 K or more. The breakthrough oc-
curred in 1986 with the work of Georg Bednorz and Alex Mu¨ller, who discovered the first
high-temperature superconductor LBCO with a transition temperature of 35 K (Bed-
norz and Mu¨ller 1988). Later, materials with a transition temperature of up to 160 K
were produced. It turned out that the materials that are superconducting at such high
temperatures are very special: they have a layered structure made up of one or more
copper-oxygen planes and exhibit an abnormal behavior also when in the normal state.
This complicates the theoretical understanding of these so-called cuprates considerably
and so it is no surprise that, despite a lot of theoretical work over the last twenty years
and a wealth of experimental data, no theoretical understanding of high-temperature
superconductivity is forthcoming.12
There is, however, a well-confirmed theory of conventional superconductors. This the-
ory, the so-called BCS theory – named after its inventors James Bardeen, Leon Cooper
and Robert Schrieffer –, is a microscopic theory that explains the appearance of a su-
perconducting phase by showing how bound pairs of electrons with opposite spin and
momentum are formed if the temperature is below the critical temperature. Although
the (fermionic) electrons in a so-called Cooper pair are often separated from each other
12See Tinkham (1996) and Waldram (1996) for (somewhat dated) overviews. More recent reviews are
Anderson (2006) and Kivelson (2006).
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by a large distance, they act effectively as a single particle which has the quantum sta-
tistical properties of a boson. And this is why a large number of Cooper pairs can be in
the lowest energy state, which in turns leads to the vanishing of the electrical resistance
in the materials. Complementing the BCS theory, Bardeen, Cooper and Schrieffer pro-
posed a specific model – the BCS model – that specifies the concrete mechanism that is
responsible for the creation of Cooper pairs. This mechanism is based on so-called s-wave
interactions of the electrons, mediated by the vibrating crystal lattice, and accounts for
all phenomena involving superconductivity discovered until 1986.13
When it comes to understanding high-temperature superconductivity, two points are
uncontroversial: (i) The BCS theory also applies, i.e. high-temperature superconduc-
tivity results from the formation of electron pairs at temperatures below the (material-
dependent) critical temperature. (ii) The BCS model does not apply. More specifically,
it is generally accepted that s-wave interactions cannot account for the extremely high
transition temperature that we find in the cuprates. And so the task is to develop a new
model. To do so, physicists follow a wide variety of approaches that can be located on a
spectrum ranging from conservative to highly revolutionary apoproaches.
Conservative approaches aim at developing an account that deviates as little as possible
from the theoretical framework of the BCS theory (i.e. the Fermi liquid theory) and
the more specific assumptions of the BCS model. Revolutionary approaches attempt to
formulate an account of high-temperature superconductivity in a new theoretical frame-
work and propose mechanisms that deviate considerably from the BCS model. While
some authors suggest different mechanisms for different types of materials, others want
to identify the mechanism of high-temperature superconductivity. Besides these extreme
approaches, a whole range of approaches in between has been put forward.
All of these approaches are developing, constantly modified and occasionally completely
rejected, but none has yet succeeded. Even twenty years after the astonishing discovery
of Bednorz and Mu¨ller, there is no satisfactory and generally accepted theory of high-
temperature superconductivity. Given that we had to wait 46 years from the discovery of
conventional superconductivity (by Heike Kamerlingh Onnes in 1911) to the formulation
of the BCS theory (in 1956), we might have to be patient for quite a while. That it
is taking so long is seen as an indication that a major theoretical breakthrough can be
expected. In situations like this, much is at stake and the debate among the members of
the relevant scientific community often touches philosophical and methodological issues.
So let us have a look at some of the proposals that are currently discussed:
1. The conservative strategy
13For technical details, see Tinkham (1996: ch. 3).
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The proponents of a conservative research strategy (such as David Pines and David
Scalapino) propose rather minimal modifications of the BCS model in order to ac-
count for the phenomenon of high-temperature superconductivity. They keep, for
example, the Fermi liquid theory as a theoretical framework. What is replaced, in
a minimal way, is the specific pairing mechanism. Instead of s-wave interactions
among the electrons, the next more complicated interactions, mediated by d-waves
(plus spin fluctuations), are considered. d-waves are suggested by the spatial struc-
ture of the substances in question and so have an empirical foundation (Scalapino
1995). Supporters of this approach (and related approaches) point to its successes
when it comes to understanding experiments. They also stress the minimal char-
acter of the modifications on the BCS model that have to be made.
Critics (such as Philip Anderson) object that the spin-fluctuation theory is not a
real theory, but just a bunch of heuristic tools with various unjustified assumptions.
It also counts against the spin-fluctuation theory, or so Anderson claims, that it can
only be applied by using high-powered computer simulations – a procedure which
cannot be controlled independently. Supporters reply that the complexity of the
problem suggests that it is treated with such methods.14
More recently, a peculiar charge ordering pattern in two separate states and regimes
of the cuprates has been discovered. To explain these patterns, S. C. Zhang used
the crystalline ordering of the d-wave Cooper pairs and showed how this new state
of matter fits into the global phase diagram of cuprates with a high transition tem-
perature. He also derived several predictions from his theory, which appear to have
recently been verified in transport measurements. Indeed, in the last decade the
experiments showed more clearly that the cuprates with a high transition tempera-
ture have a very complex phase diagram with many competing phases. In optimally
and underdoped materials, the state of matter out of which the superconductivity
arises exhibits a so-called pseudogap at temperatures which are high compared to
the transition temperature (Norman et al. 2005). The pseudogap was found only
three years after Bednorz and Mu¨ller’s original discovery, but its physical origin,
its behavior and whether it constitutes a distinct phase of matter is still not well
understood. What is clear, however, is that the pseudogap will play an important
role in any theory of high temperature superconductivity. Lee (2006), for example,
believes that the existence of the pseudogap supports the Charge Density Wave
(CDW) theory as the large pseudogap in the cuprates can be generated by a CDW
14See Anderson (1995), Anderson and Schrieffer (1991), Anderson and Mott (1996) and Ford and
Saunders (1997).
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order with d-symmetry.
2. The revolutionary strategy
Philip Anderson started off defending a truely revolutionary strategy. He submited
that the problem of understanding high-temperature superconductivity cannot be
attacked by a minimal modification of the BCS model. He hence proposed to give up
a standard assumption in solid state physics – that the system can be described as a
Fermi liquid – and to replace it with the assumption that the systems in question are,
in the normal as well as in the superconducting state, so-called Luttinger liquids.
Anderson’s account was highly speculative and was rejected by most physicists.15
Meanwhile, in the light of new experimental evidence, Anderson gave up his original
account as well and proposed a new one with a somewhat different flavor (Anderson
et al. (2004)). This new account is based on an interesting analogy between a Mott
insulator and high-temperature superconductivity and is sometimes called a theory
of a doped Mott insulator. Though less revolutionary than the old one, Anderson’s
new account is fundamentally different from other approaches that are mostly based
on perturbative many-body theory. During the last two years, it has attracted
considerable attention amongst both theorists and experimentalists. However, it is
still far from being generally accepted.
And so the question remains how conservative or revolutionary a future theory of high-
temperature superconductivity should be. As there is no consensus in the scientific
community over which strategy is the right one, a final assessment of the various strategies
is not possible at the moment. While a majority of physicists seem to be in favour of a
conservative account, Anderson’s (1995: 38) reply is still worth taking seriously: “[I]f it
is time for a revolution, enjoy it and relax!”
5 Correspondence at Bay? - Some Lessons
What are the implications of our case study for the General Correspondence Principle?
First, it has to be noted that the starting point for the development of theories of high-
temperature supercondictivity was not an internal anomaly of the predecessor theory,
i.e. the BCS theory (and the BCS model) of conventional superconducters. Quite to the
contrary, the account given by BCS turned out to be an excellent tool to learn about
the physics (and chemistry) of superconductors for many years. No one doubted, for
example, that it is a perfectly consistent theory. And yet after a while, new experimental
15See Anderson (1997) for a book-length exposition of his approach and Leggett (1997) for a criticism.
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data were produced that could not be fit into the BCS account.16 This is what prompted
the current developments.
Second, none of the proposals for a theory of high-temperature superconductivity that
have been for put forward so far contain the BCS account as a limiting case. There is,
hence, no new theory that accounts for the successes of the old theory as well as for
the class of new phenomena. And so the General Correspondence Principle seems to
be violated. Or isn’t it? A way out for the correspondence theorist is to argue that
the General Correspondence Principle cannot be applied to the case of high-temperature
superconductivity. She could argue that the corresponding materials belong to a com-
pletely different class of materials, that the phenomena in question (i.e. conventional and
high-temperature superconductivity) are too different, and that the similarity between
them is at best superficial. And so we are not supposed to apply the General Corre-
spondence Principle (or something like it). What is at stake is the question of what
the domain of applicability of methodological principles such as General Correspondence
Principle is and how we find or identify this domain. I have no principled answer to this
question (and doubt that there is one). At best, I think, we can trust the judgement of
the scientific community, which is the only authority I can see. For now, the scientific
community has not made up its mind on high-temperature superconductivity, and the
field is characterized by a large amount of dissent over questions ranging from specific
scientific questions to methodological questions.
Looking more closely at the various proposals for a theory of high-temperature supercon-
ductivity, one realizes that all of them take over some elements of the BCS account. All
of them, for example, adopt the idea that pairing is responsible for superconductivity.17
And some of them modify the BCS pairing mechanism only slightly, so that the mecha-
nism responsible for high-temperature superconductivity can be understood as a natural
extension of the mechanism for conventional superconductivity. I conclude from this that
there is certainly some continuity on the theoretical level. But continuity is not an all-
or-nothing matter (as the General Correspondence Principle makes us think). How far
the continuity reaches (or should reach) will depend on the specific case in question and
is a matter of debate. In the course of science, different (and sometimes even the same)
scientists will try out different approaches and adopt different general methodological or
scientific principles. The best way to understand this, as already argued at the end of
section 3, is to consider methodological principles as tools that are tentatively adopted by
some scientists for a specific purpose. Whether they are good tools or bad tools depends
on the specific case and will be decided, in the end, by the scientific community.
16The BCS account is the BCS theory plus the BCS model.
17For a recent discussion, see Tsai and Kivelson (2006).
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The General Correspondence Principle is just one tool among many that scientists tenta-
tively use in the process of theory (or model) construction. In many cases, there will be
a lot of dissent over the question of how closely the successor theory should be related to
its predecessor. The respective considerations are typically subtle and deeply entangled
with the problem at hand. I submit that general methodological principles unfold their
fruitful action only when adapted to a specific problem.
This raises a difficulty for those philosophers of science who are interested in the identi-
fication of general methodological principles. Instead of doing this, it might be best to
restrict oneself and help put together a toolbox of principles that scientists can tentatively
use on an as-needed basis. To do this seems to me to be an important task. It is both
doable – unlike the program of rational heuristics – and worthwhile. Philosophers of
science are especially qualified to undertake such a project, as they overlook a greater
part of science than do practitioners, who are often confined between the boundaries of
their field of specialization.
6 Rationality, Realism and Coherence
Even if the continuity that we observe in scientific theorizing does not fit into the neat
picture that goes with the Generalized Correspondence Principle, there is no doubt that
there is a lot of continuity (or stability, as Hacking puts it) in scientific theorizing. So
the following questions arise: Why is it that there is so much continuity in science? And
how can this continuity be understood philosophically? Note that these are questions
that cannot be attacked locally, i.e. on the basis of case studies alone.
In “The Social Construction of What?”, Hacking (1999) presents two explanations for the
prevelent continuity in scientific theorizing. The first explanation, realism, stresses factors
internal to science and comes in various variants. One of them is convergent realism, which
holds that successive theories of ’mature science’ approximate the truth (i.e. the ultimate
or final theory) better and better. This presupposes the existence of a measure of the
distance of a given theory from the truth (or at least an ordering relation), which is a
controverial topic despite all the worthwhile work on verisimilitude and truthlikeness18,
and conflicts with the many discontinuities that emerged in the development of ’mature’
scientific theories, as Laudan (1981) has convincingly demonstrated. Another problem
of convergent realism is that there might be no ultimate theory. It is possible that the
process of constructing ever better theories never ends because “there are infinitely many
levels of structure that can be unpacked, like an infinitely descending sequence of Chinese
18See Niiniluoto (1999) for a recent exposition.
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boxes, or to use the more colloquial expression: it is boojums all the way down” (Redhead
1993: 331).
A weaker variant of realism, which seems to be able to handle the problems raised by
Laudan and others, is structural realism. According to (one version of) this position, at
least the high-level mathematical structures of scientific theories converge. Continuity
on the level of ontology and perhaps even on the level of one or another law is not
required. However, my discussion in the previous section suggests that there is not
enough “empirical evidence” to support this position. Besides, there are more plausible
ways to explain the persistence of certain mathematical structures; I will come back to
this below.19
The second explanation discussed by Hacking, constructionism, comes in several variants
as well. All of them emphasize the role of factors external to science. For example,
in the previously-mentioned section on stability, Hacking quotes the historian of science
Norton Wise, who argues that culture and science are inseparably connected with each
other. Cultural influences go into the discovery of scientific theories and leave an indelible
footprint there. Steven Weinberg, whom Hacking quotes approvingly, argues, however,
that these influences “have been refined away” (Hacking 1999: 86).
Adopting a Kuhnian line of thought, a constructionist can explain the remarkable stabil-
ity of scientific theories as follows: she reminds us that scientists grow up and get trained
in a certain research tradition, they learn all the theories and techniques of this tradition
and, of course, they want to promote their career. These scientists are well-advised to
demonstrate their affiliation to the tradition in question by contributing to the corre-
sponding research program. All too radical junior-scientists are not protege´ed and their
careers may take a turn for the worse. After all, the scientific community does not reward
disloyal behaviour. Here is another, and perhaps somewhat more plausible, explanation
of the continuity in scientific theorizing by external factors: It is simply too costly to start
from scratch when confronted with a new scientific problem. Scientists who do so will
not be able to produce a sufficient number of publications in renowned journals which
is essential to carry on with academia. This also explains why the high-level structure
of theories is so stable: since so much depends on it, a revision or replacement would be
very costly indeed. Although there is some undeniable truth to these stories, I think that
there is more to be said.
I conclude that both explanations, realism and constructionism, do not suffice to account
for the prevalent continuity of scientific theorizing. Interestingly, they do not account for
the occasional discontinuities (or revolutions, as Hacking puts it) in scientific theorizing
19Another realist way put forward to account for the stability of scientific theories is Radder’s (1988,
1991) moderate realism.
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as well. Clearly, discontinuities do not fit in the scheme of convergent realism. But also
weaker forms of realism do not explain the relative weights of continuities and discon-
tinuities in scientific theorizing. And constructionism fails to do so as well. However,
it is the (possibly case-dependent) relative weights that cry out for an explanation and
so I conclude that an alternative explanation is needed that helps us understand why
there is as much continuities and as much discontinuities in scientific theorizing as there
is. Such an explanation should fulfill the following three conditions. (i) It should be
sufficiently general, as our goal is a philosophical understanding of the scientific practice.
(ii) It should be descriptively correct and account for successful scientific practice. (iii)
It should combine internal and external factors, as both seem to be important.
Providing an explanation of the relative weights of continuities and discontinuities in
scientific theorizing that fulfills these three conditions is a difficult task and an easy
answer such as ’realism’ or ’constructionism’ is unlikely to succeed. Instead I suggest to
adopt a formal philosophical framework and construct philosophical models within this
framework, mimicking the successful scientific methodology of constructing models of
a theory mentioned in the Introduction. The philosophical framework will be general
and satisfies condition (i). The models will provide details to account for more specific
cases, which helps satisfying condition (ii). Constructing more specific models makes
sense as the relative weights will depend on the specific scientific theories in question.
The framework we chose will make sure that internal and external factors are taken into
account, thus satisfying condition (iii). Let us now see how this works.
The central idea of my own explanation, coherentism, is that the transfer of elements of
the predecessor theory S (whose well-confirmed part S∗ is non-empty) into the successor
theory L increases the overall coherence of our knowledge system. The word “coherence”
is here used in the epistemological sense, i.e. as a measure for how well a body of beliefs
“hangs together”. As Lawrence BonJour explains, “[it] is reasonably clear that this
’hanging together’ depends on the various sorts of inferential, evidential, and explanatory
relations which obtain among the various members of a system of belief, and especially
on the more holistic and systematic of these.” (BonJour 1985: 93) Given this account of
coherence, it is plausible that S (or better: S∗) and L cohere more if, ceteris paribus, the
two theories share common elements.
Before working out my coherentist account, a potential objection has to be addressed.
One may ask why both S (or S∗) and L should be in our knowledge system at the same
time. Why isn’t S simply abandoned and replaced by a theory L which is itself more
coherent than the conjunction of S∗ and L? Although some theories in the history of
science were indeed abandoned altogether and no elements were transfered from S to
L(such as the phlogiston theory), this is often (and especially with the theories of the
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last 150 years20) not the case. Theories such as classical mechanics are still successfully
applied, although this theory is, strictly speaking, superseded by quantum mechanics
and Einstein’s theories of relativity. There are indeed a host of reasons why we still work
with (the well-confirmed part of) classical mechanics. Most importantly, perhaps, is that
classical mechanics has the practical advantage that it can be applied to problems where,
for instance, quantum mechanical calculations are not feasible (and would presumably
give the same result anyway). There is, however, also an epistemic reason why classical
mechanics is still so popular. The theory provides explanations that quantum mechanics
is unable to provide. This is, again for practical reasons, because classical mechanics can
account for phenomena quantum mechanics cannot account for. However, we also favor
the Newtonian explanation of, say, the tides over an explanation based on Einstein’s
general theory of relativity as the concepts classical mechanics employs (such as force)
are “closer” to the phenomenon in question which arguably helps us to understand. An
explanation of the tides based on the properties of curved spacetime would only obscure
the situation. Good explanations function like this, and as it is one of the goals of the
scientific enterprise to provide explanations of the phenomena in its domain, (the well
confirmed part of) classical mechanics is indispensable and remains an integral part of
our knowledge system.
Let us now develop our tentative account of scientific theory change. To do so, we need
(i) a precise account of the notion of coherence and how it is measured. To measure
the coherence of a scientific theory (or of a set of scientific theories), we also need (ii)
a representation of a scientific theory that suits this request. As we will see, choosing a
Bayesian framework will satisfy both requests.
We explicate (the empirical part of) a scientific theory T as a set of interrelated models
{M1, . . . ,Mn}. Here a model is represented by a proposition Mi which may itself be a
conjunction of more elementary propositions (such as instantiations of laws, additonal
model assumptions and initial and boundary conditions). Each model Mi is related to
a phenomenon, represented by a proposition Ei (for “evidence”), that it accounts for.
We define a probability distribution P over all model variables Mi and all phenomena
variables Ei. This probability distribution is best represented by a Bayesian Network.
In such a network, there is an arrow from each model node Mi to its corresponding
phenomenon node Ei, and there are various arrows between the model nodes which reflects
the idea that the models in a scientific theory mutually support each other. By doing so,
BonJour’s “various sorts of inferential, evidential, and explanatory relations which obtain
among the various members of a system of belief” can be modeled probabilistically. For
example, if model M2 entails model M1, then P (M1|M2) = 1, and if model M2 supports
20Cf. Fahrbach (forthcoming).
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model M1, then P (M1|M2) > P (M1) (for details, see Hartmann (2007)).
In the next step, these probabilistic dependencies between models have to be aggregated
to arrive at a coherence measure coh(T ) of the theory T . While there are several different
proposals in the literature for how to do this, my preferred one is laid out in my book
Bayesian Epistemology (with Luc Bovens). In this book, we show that no such coherence
measure exists and that all that can be done is the specification of a function that
generates a partial ordering over a set T = {T1, . . . , Tn} of theories. Sometimes there is
no fact of the matter, which of two theories is more coherent. But often there is.
At this point, the natural question arises why coherence is a good thing. Even if scientists
do aim for a highly coherent knowledge system (which explains the use of correspondence
considerations), it is not clear why science should aim for a highly coherent knowledge
system. So what is at stake is the normative question. Simply put, the answer is that,
given certain conditions, coherence is truth-conducive.21 In the Bayesian framweork, this
means that the more coherent set of, say, models, is also the one that has the greater
posterior probability (provided that certain ceteris paribus conditions are satisfied). This
is an important result as it makes informal discussions of the coherence theory of justifi-
cation more precise (Bovens and Hartmann (2003a, b)).
Similarly, the following can be proven: If the new theory L adds one additional model to
its predecessor S∗ and if L is more coherent than S∗, then L has a higher posterior prob-
ability than S∗ if the prior probability of L is not much lower than the prior probability
of S∗. For details and a proof, see Hartmann (in preparation). Note that there is clearly
a correspondence relation between S∗ and L as all successes (as well as the failures) of
the old theory are taken over in the new, more encompassing theory.
What I have presented are the initial steps of a philosophical research program. Clearly
much more needs to be said and more philosophical models have to be studied to better
evaluate the prospects of a full-fledged Bayesian account of scientific theory change. For
example, a Bayesian account of the various correspondence relations discussed in sec. 3
has to be given. If all goes well, we have a methodology at hand that will help us to explain
(using the notion of coherence) and justify (using the truth-conduciveness of coherence)
the successful scientific practice. But we have to be cautious and not expect too much.
As Earman (1992: ch. 8) points out, scientific theory change presents a whole range of
other problems for the Bayesian. So I do not pretend that all aspects of scientific theory
change can be accounted for in Bayesian term. However, until the contrary is proven,
I follow Salmon (1990) and take Bayesianism to be an attractive philosophical research
21I here follow the standard usuage of the term. Note, however, that “truth-conducive” is a misnomer
as Bayesians only specify subjective probabilities, and a posterior probability of 1 does not entail the
truth of the proposition in question. I thank Kevin Kelly for pointing this out to me.
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program that helps us to illuminate the intricacies of scientific theory change.
Before closing, a word is in order about the nature of the probabilities in our Bayesian
framework. Bayesians typically assume that individual agents have subjective degrees
of belief which I take to include internal as well as external factors. These degrees
of belief may differ from scientist to scientist as different scientists may have different
background knowledge and different “scientific tastes”. And yet, we observe that different
scientists often assess new hypotheses similarly and reach similar conclusions about their
acceptability. There is much to Kuhn’s idea that the scientific community is the real
decision-making agent, and it is an interesting research project to construct models for the
aggregation of individual probability functions to a probability function of the scientific
community. I have to leave this task for another occasion.
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